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Introduction 
 
 Loan guarantees are used by the federal government to promote key areas of industry and 
encourage commercial development.  By offering a guarantee on a loan, the federal government provides 
financial security for borrowers in sectors that are often considered too risky for lenders. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) says, “Federal loan guarantee programs help borrowers get credit from 
private sector lenders—the federal government guarantees to pay lenders if the borrowers default on 
loans, which makes extending credit more attractive to lenders.”1 Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (EPACT 05, P.L.109-58), gives the Department of Energy (DOE) authority to offer loan guarantees 
for new and innovative technologies that avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and are not currently in commercial use for energy production. Eligible 
technologies include renewable energy, energy efficiency, advanced nuclear and fossil, and carbon 
capture and sequestration, to name a few. 
 The 2007 energy bills that have passed the House and Senate and await conference both offer 
provisions which amend the EPACT 05 loan guarantee program. The Senate bill (H.R. 6) would 
significantly alter how DOE provides loan guarantees for new energy technologies, including nuclear 
power plants. The House-passed legislation (HR. 3221) is different; it states that no eligible technology 
can be excluded from consideration for loan guarantees. For these and other reasons, it is important to 
examine these provisions thoroughly to assess their potential impacts to this taxpayer-funded program. 
The liability to taxpayers is potentially high, in part due to the costs and risks associated with constructing 
nuclear power plants.  
 A provision of the Senate bill exempts DOE’s loan guarantee program from Sec. 504(b) of the 
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). The Senate provision allows, among other things, for DOE 
to write unlimited loan guarantees without Congressional oversight. If adopted, this provision removes 
Congressional authority and the safeguards in place through the appropriation process, and shifts the 
financial risk from private lenders to taxpayers. Initial analyses of the loan guarantee program have shown 
that DOE lacks the infrastructure necessary to effectively implement its program. Reports from the GAO 
and DOE’s Office of the Inspector General state that the necessary policies, procedures, and staff remain 
absent, raising questions about DOE’s ability to manage its loan guarantee program. This Issue Brief 
explores these issues raised by the 2007 energy bill provisions, as they pose potentially significant risks 
and high costs to America’s taxpayers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 GAO Report: Key Steps Needed to Help Ensure the Success of the New Loan Guarantee Program for Innovative 
Technologies by Better Managing Its Financial Risks, GAO-07-339R, February 28, 2007 
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Federal Legislation 
 
Current Legislation 
The energy bills currently under consideration in the House and the Senate make changes to the 
legislation already in place. EPACT 05 Title XVII specifies that DOE can make loan guarantees for 
innovative energy projects that include “advanced nuclear technologies.” 2 Under Sec. 1702 (c) of EPACT 
05, “A guarantee by the Secretary [of Energy] shall not exceed an amount equal to 80 percent of the 
project cost of the facility that is the subject of the guarantee, as estimated at the time at which the 
guarantee is issued.” The extent to which the federal government would guarantee this loan was not 
specified until October 4, 2007, when final regulations for the program were issued by DOE. The 
Department announced, “The final regulation provides that the Department may issue guarantees for up to 
100 percent of the amount of a loan, subject to the EPACT 05 limitation that DOE may not guarantee a 
debt instrument for more than 80 percent of the total cost of an eligible project.”3  
Funds for the loan guarantee program are to be appropriated by Congress as stated in FCRA. The 
purposes of FCRA are to measure more accurately the costs of Federal credit programs; place the cost of 
credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other Federal spending; encourage the delivery of 
benefits in the form most appropriate to the needs of beneficiaries; and improve the allocation of 
resources among credit programs and between credit and other spending programs. Section 504(b) of 
FCRA requires that any federal loan guarantees must receive new budget authority and a limitation on the 
funds for the cost of the loan as determined in an appropriations act.  
 
Proposed Legislation 
Under the Senate energy bill (H.R.6), which passed the Senate on June 21 by a vote of 65-27, key 
changes are made to the loan guarantees that the federal government provides for innovative energy 
technologies. Sec. 1703 (a)(2) of EPACT 05 designates loan guarantees for projects that “employ new or 
significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service to the United 
States at the time the guarantee is issued.” The Senate bill amends this designation, by excluding from the 
definition of commercial technology those projects that are in connection with “a demonstration plant; or 
a project for which the Secretary approved a loan guarantee.”4 Broadening the definition of projects 
excluded from commercial technology (and therefore eligible for loan guarantees) allows DOE to provide 
loan guarantees to many projects that use the same technology. This leads to the possibility of several 
nuclear power plants of the same design receiving loan guarantees as “advanced nuclear technologies.” 
Additionally, the Senate bill excludes loan guarantees from the authority of FCRA.5  While a 
February 2007 GAO report notes, “The Federal Credit Reform Act requires that Congress appropriate 
budget authority for loan guarantee program costs before loans can be made,” the Senate bill seeks to 
exempt this program from Congressional oversight completely. H.R. 6 Sec. 124(b)(2) specifically states 
that “Section 504(b) of the Federal Credit Reform Act shall not apply to a loan or a loan guarantee made 
in accordance with paragraph (1)(B).”6 Furthermore, fees collected by the Secretary to cover 
administrative expenses for the loans will now go into a fund known as “Incentives for Innovative 
Technologies Fund,” which will “remain available to the Secretary for expenditure, without further 
appropriation or fiscal year limitation.”7 This amendment, giving DOE unregulated access to the fund and 
removing Congressional appropriation authority, has been criticized by the Bush Administration, as noted 
in a statement released by the Office of Management and Budget: “The Administration strongly opposes 
                                                 
2 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Title XVII, Sec. 1703 (b) 
3 Department of Energy Office of Public Affairs Press Release, October 4, 2007 
4 H.R.6 Sec.124 (b)(1) 
5 H.R.6 Sec.124 (b)(2)  
6 H.R.6 Sec.124 (b)(1)(B) stipulates that no guarantee shall be made unless “the Secretary has received from the 
borrower a payment in full for the cost of the obligation and deposited the payment into the Treasury.” 
7 H.R.6 Sec.124 (b)(5) 
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the bill’s modifications to the EPACT 05 Title XVII loan guarantee program, many of which are 
inconsistent with FCRA and long-standing Federal credit policy.”8  
The House bill (H.R.3221), which passed the House on August 4 by a vote of 241 – 172, makes 
two key amendments to loan guarantees in EPACT 05 as well. While the original legislation specifies that 
the federal loan will cover 80 percent of the project cost, Sec. 9201 of the House bill amends this section 
to additionally note that the Secretary will guarantee up to 100 percent of this loan. This amendment now 
reiterates the final regulations announced by DOE on October 4, 2007, which also state that DOE will 
guarantee 100 percent of the loan. 9,10 Furthermore, Sec.1704 is amended to prevent any category of 
eligible projects from being excluded from appropriations.11 In essence, this prevents any particular 
technology, such as nuclear technology, from being excluded from appropriated funds. 
 
Costs 
 
 The request for loan guarantees to begin new nuclear projects in the United States is estimated to 
be at least $50 billion in the first two years. This amount surpasses the $49.7 billion DOE spent on 
nuclear power R&D in the entire 30 years from 1973-2003.12 In a statement on the floor of the House, 
Rep. Peter Visclosky said, “The Nuclear Energy [Institute] indicates a need for $25 billion in Federal 
guaranteed loans for fiscal year 2008 and more than that in fiscal year 2009.”13 Some studies estimate 
very low costs for new plants (various year dollars) such as EIA, University of Chicago, and vendors 
($1500-2100/kW). Others do not, such as the Keystone Center, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Florida 
Power & Light ($3600-6000/kW). 14 A recent report commissioned by Nonproliferation Policy Education 
Center gives cost estimates in real 2007 dollars ranging from $4,300-4,500/kW for final construction 
costs, which comes out to $4.3-4.5 billion for a typical 1000MW nuclear power plant.15  
 If a loan guarantee is granted, DOE would issue a loan for 80 percent of these costs, and the 
nuclear industry would in turn pay a subsidy cost to the Department. The subsidy cost is defined as “the 
estimated net present value of long-term cost to the federal government of guaranteeing the loans over the 
entire period that the loans are outstanding, excluding administrative costs.”16 The subsidy cost is like an 
insurance premium, and may be different for each project. Because this cost is estimated, it is possible for 
shortfalls to occur if the cost estimate is too low, resulting in a loss to the federal government. Despite the 
risk of loss, DOE has not yet established a procedure for determining these costs. The GAO reports that 
“DOE will have to estimate the subsidy cost to determine the fees to charge borrowers, but it currently 
has no policies or procedures for doing so.”17 Furthermore, should shortfalls occur, these costs are to be 
covered by the federal government.  “Under federal law, shortfalls in subsidy costs are funded by a 
permanent indefinite appropriation, not through the annual appropriations process,” the GAO notes.18 
This becomes an issue for taxpayers as well, because the money to fund any shortfall will ultimately come 
from taxes paid to the federal government. “Although [loan guarantee program] LGP guidelines call for 
                                                 
8 Office of Management and Budget Statement of Administration Policy Regarding H.R.6, June 12, 2007 
9 H.R.3221 Sec.9201 
10 Department of Energy Office of Public Affairs Press Release, October 4, 2007 
11 H.R.3221 Sec.9202 
12 Congressional Research Service, CRS-IB10041, June 2005 
13 Congressional Record, Vol. 153, No. 99, June 19, 2007,  p. H6713 
14 Environment and Energy Study Institute Briefing: "Costs and Risks of Nuclear Loan Guarantees," 
Jim Harding, October 30, 2007 
15 Report commissioned by Nonproliferation Policy Education Center: “Economics of Nuclear Power and 
Proliferation Risks in a Carbon Constrained World,” Jim Harding, June 2007 
16 GAO Report: Observations on Actions Implement the New Loan Guarantee Program Innovative Technologies, 
GAO-07-798T, April 24, 2007 
17 GAO-07-339R, February 28, 2007 
18 GAO-07-798T, April 24, 2007 
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borrowers to be charged fees to cover program costs,” the GAO says, “the program could result in 
substantial financial costs to taxpayers if DOE underestimates total program costs.”19 
 
Taxpayer Risk and Liability 
  
 The cost to taxpayers from underestimated subsidy costs and possible loan guarantee defaults is 
potentially high, and so is the risk. In its history within the United States, the nuclear energy industry has 
experienced significant cost overruns, sometimes reaching over 350 percent of the estimated costs for the 
project. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported cost overruns for the years 1966 
through 1977 that ranged in each two-year period from 200 to 380 percent of the original estimated costs 
for construction.20 Additional costs could also come as supplies become scarce from increased 
construction of nuclear power plants. “The rapid rate of nuclear reactor expansion required to make even 
a modest reduction in global warming would drive up construction costs and create shortages in building 
materials, trained personnel, and safety controls,” Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, stated in a report on nuclear energy.21 Such risks are difficult to quantify and therefore 
estimate, prior to the start of construction. 
 The likelihood of default on such loan guarantees is an area of considerable risk to taxpayers. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), when investigating the costs for new nuclear construction projects, 
considers the risk of default to be above 50 percent.22 Although no such program has existed in DOE prior 
to now, there is still history of loan defaults in the nuclear industry. The largest bond to ever default in the 
municipal bond market belonged to Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS), for a bond used 
to construct two nuclear power plants in the 1970s.The default was for $2.25 billion.23 While this bond 
default affected a number of bondholders, the current loan guarantee program passes the risk on to the 
federal government, meaning the taxpayers share a large portion of the risk as well. The Congressional 
Research Service emphasized the financial threat faced by the federal government in a report to Congress 
earlier this year. “The federal government would bear most of the risk [of constructing new commercial 
reactors], facing potentially large losses if borrowers defaulted on reactor projects that could not be 
salvaged,” the report commented.24 Should a borrower default, EPACT 05 designates DOE as the primary 
manager of the project. Upon paying off the loan, DOE can either “take over the project for completion, 
operation, or disposition; or reach an agreement with the borrower to continue the project.”25 
 
Loan Guarantee Program Infrastructure at DOE 
 
Following the passage of EPACT 05 in 2005, DOE initiated its loan guarantee program for 
innovative technologies in fiscal year 2006. This was prior to having appropriations or regulations in 
place. DOE first proposed transferring appropriations from other appropriated DOE accounts in May 
2006, followed by a solicitation for preapplications to the program a few months later in August. A report 
released by the GAO in February 2007 made note of the fact that many necessary policies and procedures 
for the program were still lacking: “At the time of our review, DOE had not taken steps to ensure that it 
had in place the critical policies, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to ensure the program’s 
                                                 
19 GAO-07-339R, February 28, 2007 
20 Mark Gielecki and James Hewlett, Commercial Nuclear Power in the United States: Problems and Prospects, US 
Energy Information Administration, August 1994. 
21 Richard Haass, foreword to Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks by Charles D. Ferguson, CSR No. 28, 
April 2007. 
22 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for S.14 Energy Policy Act of 2003, May 7, 2003. 
23 New York Times, “Lawyers Agree to Pay In Utility Bond Default,” December 26, 1987 
24 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Nuclear Power—Outlook for New US Reactors, March 9, 
2007 
25 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Nuclear Power—Outlook for New US Reactors, March 9, 
2007 
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success.”26 Likewise, the DOE Office of the Inspector General issued a report with many similar findings, 
paying specific attention to the lack of staff essential to implement the program. In its report released in 
September 2007, it stated, “At the time of our review a full complement of Federal staff designated to 
administer the loan guarantee program was not in place and plans to utilize technical experts to assist in 
the administration of the program had not been fully developed.”27 The Inspector General’s report 
concluded, “There are a number of additional steps that should be taken to foster the success of the loan 
guarantee program,” though at the time of the report, these had not yet been taken. 28 
 Along with a lack of both manpower and procedure in DOE’s loan guarantee program, its early 
actions in initial stages of the program raise doubts as well about its management. Without having 
received specific appropriations, DOE proposed transferring funds from some of its accounts to start the 
program. DOE chose to solicit preapplications prior to finalizing its regulations, leaving much of the 
program’s structure and authority in question. The White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) expressed its concern about such an action, stating, “The Administration believes that it is unwise 
to amend that authority while the program is still in the early stages of implementation.”29 Similarly, the 
GAO offered its review of the actions taken by DOE: “[It] should not have begun implementation of the 
LGP without a specific appropriation. Nevertheless, DOE did begin implementation, and its approach to 
the LGP raised serious questions about whether this program and its financial risks would be well 
managed.”30  
 Even DOE’s own Office of the Inspector General noted prior actions by governmental agencies in 
similar situations were sometimes questionable. “In reviewing audits of past governmental loan guarantee 
programs, we found that the agencies involved had not always exercised due diligence during critical 
phases of the loan guarantee process,” it found.31 Such findings demonstrate that the infrastructure 
required to carry out a successful loan guarantee program has yet to be attained at DOE.  
 
Financial Considerations 
 
 The position taken by Wall Street regarding investing in nuclear energy indicates the financial 
risk involved. Six of the nation’s largest investors—Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley—submitted comments to DOE in response to a notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the loan guarantee program in June 2007. At the time the comments were 
submitted, DOE had promised to guarantee loans for up to 80 percent of the project costs, but had not, as 
of then, determined what percent of this debt it would guarantee. The investors urged greater financial 
support from the federal government, stating, “We believe these risks, combined with the higher capital 
costs and longer construction schedules of nuclear plants as compared to other generation facilities, will 
make lenders unwilling at present to extend long-term credit.”32 Members of this group also made note of 
the many investment concerns associated with nuclear energy: “Lenders and investors in the fixed income 
markets will be acutely concerned about a number of political, regulatory and litigation-related risks that 
are unique to nuclear power, including the possibility of delays.”33 They concluded that DOE should 
                                                 
26 GAO-07-798T, April 24, 2007 
27 DOE Office of Inspector General Special Report: Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies, 
September, 2007 
28 DOE Office of Inspector General Special Report: Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies, 
September, 2007 
29 Office of Management and Budget Statement of Administration Policy Regarding H.R.6, June 12, 2007 
30 GAO-07-798T, April 24, 2007 
31 DOE Office of Inspector General Special Report: Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies, 
September 2007 
32 Investors’ Comments in Response to DOE Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Loan Guarantees for Projects that 
Employ Innovative Technologies, July 2, 2007 
33 Investors’ Comments in Response to DOE Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, July 2, 2007 
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guarantee 100 percent of the loans as one of the “minimum conditions necessary to secure project 
financing from lenders and from investors in the fixed income markets.”34  
 The nuclear industry itself has made clear that the construction of new nuclear projects will rely 
heavily upon the financial backing of DOE through the loan guarantee program. A press release from the 
Nuclear Energy Institute on October 4, 2007, demonstrated this view when it announced, “It is imperative 
that the Energy Department have in place a loan guarantee program that will support the financing for 
these large, capital-intensive power plant projects.”35 Both the nuclear industry and Wall Street investors 
make it clear that new nuclear projects carry a significant financial risk, one that neither wants to carry 
without support from the federal government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The loan guarantee program authorized by EPACT 05 allows DOE to support the early 
commercial use of advanced technologies in the energy industry. It provides financial security that many 
new technologies lack as they enter into commercial production. It is prudent that this program be 
implemented in the most effective and financially sound manner.  
 The issues discussed here demonstrate that provisions in the Senate and House energy bills come 
with potentially significant risks.  While provisions in both bills may make it easier for nuclear energy to 
receive loan guarantees, the Senate bill in particular excludes DOE from Congressional oversight when 
writing these loan guarantees and provides it with unregulated access to the “Incentives for Innovative 
Technologies Fund.” The Department of Energy itself has not, as of yet, developed the policies and 
procedures or filled the staffing needs that are required to appropriately implement its loan guarantee 
program. The loan guarantee provisions pose a potentially significant liability for DOE and ultimately the 
American taxpayers by offering loan guarantees to the nuclear power industry. With an estimated $50 
billion dollars requested by the nuclear industry for the first two years of development, it is prudent to 
carefully weigh the costs and benefits when considering the loan guarantee provisions in the 2007 energy 
bills. 
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34 Investors’ Comments in Response to DOE Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, July 2, 2007 
35 Nuclear Energy Institute Press Release, October 4, 2007 
